Showing posts with label Equitable Subrogation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Equitable Subrogation. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 27, 2018

There Are No Such Things -- First Department Affirms Dismissal of CGL Insurer's "Equitable Indemnity" and "Equitable Reapportionment" Causes of Action

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY – COMMERCIAL UMBRELLA LIABILITY – COINSURANCE RECOVERY ACTION 
United Natl. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am.
(1st Dept., 2/27/2018)

Construction site accident.  Injured employee of subcontractor Phoenix Mechanical Piping, LLC, sued the property owner, Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company, and general contractor Independent Temperature Control Services, Inc. (ITCS).  ITCS impleaded Phoenix Mechanical, presumably for contribution and/or indemnification.

Plaintiff, Utica National Insurance Company, insured Phoenix Mechanical under a CGL policy with a $1 million per occurrence coverage limit.  Defendant Travelers insured MetLife, Inc. under a CGL policy with a $2 million per occurrence limit.  Defendant Zurich insured MetLife under a commercial umbrella liability policy with a $25 million per occurrence limit.  Defendant National Union insured Phoenix Mechanical under a commercial umbrella liability policy with a $1 million per occurrence limit.

United National defended the personal injury action, allegedly expending over $500,000 in doing so.  Following a jury trial, judgment was entered for the underlying personal injury plaintiff in the amount of $6,697,534.93. United National paid $1,075,000 in indemnification towards that judgment, with Travelers, Zurich and National Union paying the rest.

United National then brought this coinsurance recovery action against the defendant insurers, alleging that because it did not owe defense or indemnification coverage to Phoenix Mechanical at all based on the "Residential Projects Exclusion" contained in United National’s policy, the defendant insurers were obligated to reimburse United National for its defense and indemnification costs.  United National's complaint alleged seven causes of action, styled as:
I.     Equitable Indemnity
II.    Equitable Indemnity
III.   Equitable Contribution
IV.    Equitable Reapportionment
V.     Equitable Subrogation
VI.   Equitable Subrogation
VII.  Declaratory Judgment
Supreme Court granted Zurich's motion to dismiss the first, second and fourth causes of action of the complaint and United National appealed.  In AFFIRMING the dismissal order, the First Department held:
The motion court properly dismissed plaintiff's first and second causes of action for "equitable indemnity" and fourth cause of action for "equitable reapportionment" as against Zurich since there is no recognized cause of action for equitable indemnity or equitable reapportionment under New York law. Furthermore, even assuming that truth of the facts as alleged by plaintiff, these claims do not "state[] the elements of a legally cognizable cause of action" (P.T. Bank Cent. Asia, N.Y. Branch v ABN AMRO Bank N.V., 301 AD2d 373, 376 [1st Dept 2003]; see 1199 Hous. Corp. v International Fid. Ins. Co., 14 AD3d 383, 384 [1st Dept 2005]).
In insurer coinsurance recovery actions, there are no such things as equitable indemnity or equitable reapportionment in New York.

Monday, December 7, 2015

Primary vs. Umbrella -- No Duty, No Standing, No Suit

PERSONAL AUTO – PRIMARY POLICY – UMBRELLA POLICY – STANDING – EQUITABLE SUBROGATION – VOLUNTARY PAYMENT
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co.
2nd Dept., decided 11/25/2015)

You probably know that an umbrella insurer may sue and maintain an action against a primary insurer, but what about the other way around?  Not in this case.

Freier had a primary personal auto policy with GEICO and an umbrella policy with RLI.  After an auto accident, GEICO undertook to defend Freier in a personal injury action against her.  RLI disclaimed coverage based on late notice.  GEICO eventually paid $200,000 more than its policy limit to settle the action against Freier and commenced this action against RLI for reimbursement of that amount, seeking to challenge RLI's disclaimer.

In AFFIRMING Supreme Court's order granting RLI's motion to dismiss the complaint, the Second Department, Appellate Division, held
As the Supreme Court properly concluded, GEICO did not have standing to seek that relief. ... Here, it is undisputed that the coverage provided by the RLI policy was excess to GEICO's policy and, thus, RLI's duty to indemnify the Freiers was not triggered until coverage under GEICO's policy was exhausted. ... Therefore, GEICO did not stand to benefit from the RLI policy, depriving it of standing to seek a declaration of RLI's duty to indemnify under that policy... Accordingly, the court properly granted RLI's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. 
The Second Department also held that: (1) GEICO failed to demonstrate the existence of any duty running from RLI, the excess carrier, to GEICO, the primary insurer, with respect to RLI's coverage determination; and (2) contrary to GEICO's contention, the doctrine of equitable subrogation cannot be invoked where, as here, the payments sought to be recovered were voluntary.

Thursday, November 12, 2009

New York State Legislature Passes New Anti-Subrogation Law -- Effective November 12, 2009

On November 10, 2009, both the New York State Senate and Assembly passed Senate Bill S66002, as substituted for Assembly Bill A40002.  The bill was delivered to Governor Paterson, who signed it today, November 12, 2009.

Comprising six separate parts, A through F, the bill is self-described as:
AN ACT to amend the insurance law, in relation to municipal cooperative health benefit plans, a study of community rating and the provision of claims experience to a municipality (Part A); to amend the general municipal law and the highway law, in relation to mutual aid (Part B); to amend the public health law, in relation to the composition of county and part-county boards of health (Part C); to amend the general municipal law, in relation to purchasing requirements (Part D); to amend the public authorities law and the local finance law, in relation to authorizing certain bonds to be issued or purchased by the municipal bond bank agency (Part E); and to amend the civil practice law and rules, in relation to treating public and private defendants equally when considering the impact of collateral source payments in tort claims for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death; to amend the general obligations law, in relation to protecting parties to the settlement of a tort claim from certain unwarranted lien, reimbursement and subrogation claims; and to repeal certain provisions of the civil practice law and rules relating to collateral source payments (Part F)
It is Part F that will affect the prospective handling of tort claims in New York State.  The nine sections of Part F of the bill are:
  • § 1 -- repeals subdivisions (a) and (b)of CPLR § 4545
  • § 2 -- amends subdivision (c) and reletters it as subdivision (a) of CPLR § 4545
  • § 3 -- reletters subdivision (d) and as subdivision (b) of CPLR § 4545
  • § 4 -- repeals subdivision (e) of CPLR Rule 4111
  • § 5 -- amends subdivision (f) and reletters it subdivision (e) of CPLR Rule 4111
  • § 6 -- amends subdivision (b) of CPLR § 4213
  • § 7 -- adds a new subdivision 4 to General Obligations Law § 5-101
  • § 8 -- adds new section 5-335 to General Obligations Law 
  • § 9 -- provides for the effective dates of these amended and new statutes
The complete text of the entire bill is here.  The text of Part F, with stricken statutory language language bracketed and struckthrough and new provisions capitalized and underlined, is as follows:

PART F

19  Section 1. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 4545 of the civil prac-
   20  tice law and rules are REPEALED.
   21    § 2. Subdivision (c) of section 4545 of the  civil  practice  law  and
   22  rules,  as  added by chapter 220 of the laws of 1986, is amended to read
   23  as follows:
   24    [(c)] (a) Actions for personal injury, injury to property or  wrongful
   25  death.    In  any action brought to recover damages for personal injury,
   26  injury to property or wrongful  death,  where  the  plaintiff  seeks  to
   27  recover  for  the  cost  of medical care, dental care, custodial care or
   28  rehabilitation services,  loss  of  earnings  or  other  economic  loss,
   29  evidence shall be admissible for consideration by the court to establish
   30  that  any  such past or future cost or expense was or will, with reason-
   31  able certainty, be replaced or indemnified, in whole or  in  part,  from
   32  any  collateral  source  [such  as  insurance (], except for life insur-
   33  ance[), social security (except  those  benefits  provided  under  title
   34  XVIII  of  the  social  security act), workers' compensation or employee
   35  benefit programs (except such collateral  sources  entitled  by  law  to
   36  liens  against any recovery of the plaintiff)]  AND THOSE PAYMENTS AS TO
   37  WHICH THERE IS A STATUTORY RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT.  If the  court  finds
   38  that any such cost or expense was or will, with reasonable certainty, be
   39  replaced or indemnified from any SUCH collateral source, it shall reduce
   40  the  amount  of  the award by such finding, minus an amount equal to the
   41  premiums paid by the plaintiff for such benefits for the two-year period
   42  immediately preceding the accrual of such action  and  minus  an  amount
   43  equal  to the projected future cost to the plaintiff of maintaining such
   44  benefits. In order to find that any future cost or  expense  will,  with
   45  reasonable  certainty,  be  replaced  or  indemnified  by the collateral
   46  source, the court must find that the plaintiff is  legally  entitled  to
   47  the  continued receipt of such collateral source, pursuant to a contract
   48  or otherwise  enforceable  agreement,  subject  only  to  the  continued
   49  payment  of  a  premium  and  such other financial obligations as may be
   50  required by such agreement.  ANY COLLATERAL SOURCE DEDUCTION REQUIRED BY
   51  THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL BE MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT AFTER THE RENDERING OF
   52  THE JURY'S VERDICT.   THE PLAINTIFF MAY PROVE  HIS  OR  HER  LOSSES  AND
   53  EXPENSES  AT THE TRIAL IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER SUCH SUMS WILL LATER HAVE
   54  TO BE DEDUCTED FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY.
       S. 2                               19                               A. 2

    1    § 3. Subdivision (d) of section 4545 of the  civil  practice  law  and
    2  rules is relettered subdivision (b).
    3    §  4. Subdivision (e) of rule 4111 of the civil practice law and rules
    4  is REPEALED.
    5    § 5. Subdivision (f) of rule 4111 of the civil practice law and rules,
    6  as amended by chapter 100 of the laws of 1994, is relettered subdivision
    7  (e) and amended to read as follows:
    8    (e) Itemized verdict in certain  actions.  In  an  action  brought  to
    9  recover  damages  for  personal  injury,  injury to property or wrongful
   10  death, which is not subject to [subdivisions] SUBDIVISION (d) [and  (e)]
   11  of this rule, the court shall instruct the jury that if the jury finds a
   12  verdict awarding damages, it shall in its verdict specify the applicable
   13  elements  of  special  and general damages upon which the award is based
   14  and the amount assigned to each element including, but not  limited  to,
   15  medical expenses, dental expenses, loss of earnings, impairment of earn-
   16  ing ability, and pain and suffering. Each element shall be further item-
   17  ized  into  amounts  intended  to  compensate for damages that have been
   18  incurred prior to the verdict and amounts  intended  to  compensate  for
   19  damages  to  be incurred in the future. In itemizing amounts intended to
   20  compensate for future damages, the jury shall set forth  the  period  of
   21  years  over which such amounts are intended to provide compensation.  In
   22  actions in which article fifty-A or fifty-B of this chapter applies,  in
   23  computing  said  damages, the jury shall be instructed to award the full
   24  amount of future damages, as calculated, without  reduction  to  present
   25  value.
   26    §  6.  Subdivision  (b)  of section 4213 of the civil practice law and
   27  rules, as separately amended by chapters 485 and  682  of  the  laws  of
   28  1986, is amended to read as follows:
   29    (b)  Form  of  decision.  The  decision of the court may be oral or in
   30  writing and shall state the facts it deems  essential.  In  [a  medical,
   31  dental  or podiatric malpractice action or in an action against a public
   32  employer or a public employee who is subject  to  indemnification  by  a
   33  public  employer  with respect to such action or both, as such terms are
   34  defined in subdivision (b) of section forty-five hundred forty-five, for
   35  personal injury or wrongful death arising out of an injury sustained  by
   36  a public employee while acting within the scope of his public employment
   37  or  duties,  and  in]  any [other] action brought to recover damages for
   38  personal injury, injury to  property,  or  wrongful  death,  a  decision
   39  awarding  damages  shall  specify the applicable elements of special and
   40  general damages upon which the award is based and the amount assigned to
   41  each element, including but not  limited  to  medical  expenses,  dental
   42  expenses,  podiatric  expenses,  loss of earnings, impairment of earning
   43  ability, and pain and suffering. In a medical, dental or podiatric malp-
   44  ractice action, [and in any other action brought to recover damages  for
   45  personal  injury,  injury  to  property, or wrongful death, each element
   46  shall be further  itemized  into  amounts  intended  to  compensate  for
   47  damages  which  have  been  incurred  prior  to the decision and amounts
   48  intended to compensate for damages to be  incurred  in  the  future.  In
   49  itemizing  amounts  intended to compensate for future damages, the court
   50  shall set forth the period of years over which such amounts are intended
   51  to provide compensation. In computing  said  damages,  the  court  shall
   52  award  the  full  amount  of  future  damages,  as  calculated,  without
   53  reduction to present value] COMMENCED ON OR AFTER JULY TWENTY-SIXTH, TWO
   54  THOUSAND THREE, THE COURT'S DECISION AS TO FUTURE DAMAGES SHALL BE ITEM-
   55  IZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBDIVISION (D) OF RULE FORTY-ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN
   56  OF THIS CHAPTER.  IN ANY ACTION BROUGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR  PERSONAL
       S. 2                               20                               A. 2

    1  INJURY,  INJURY  TO  PROPERTY  OR  WRONGFUL DEATH, OTHER THAN A MEDICAL,
    2  DENTAL OR PODIATRIC MALPRACTICE ACTION COMMENCED ON OR AFTER JULY  TWEN-
    3  TY-SIXTH,  TWO THOUSAND THREE, THE COURT'S DECISION AS TO FUTURE DAMAGES
    4  SHALL  BE  ITEMIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBDIVISION (E) OF RULE FORTY-ONE
    5  HUNDRED ELEVEN OF THIS CHAPTER.
    6    § 7. Section 5-101 of the general obligations law is amended by adding
    7  a new subdivision 4 to read as follows:
    8    4. AS USED IN SECTION 5-335 OF THIS ARTICLE, THE TERM "BENEFIT PROVID-
    9  ER" MEANS ANY INSURER, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION,  HEALTH  BENEFIT
   10  PLAN,  PREFERRED  PROVIDER  ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN OR OTHER
   11  ENTITY WHICH PROVIDES  FOR  PAYMENT  OR  REIMBURSEMENT  OF  HEALTH  CARE
   12  EXPENSES,  HEALTH CARE SERVICES, DISABILITY PAYMENTS, LOST WAGE PAYMENTS
   13  OR ANY OTHER BENEFITS UNDER A POLICY OF INSURANCE OR  CONTRACT  WITH  AN
   14  INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP.
   15    §  8.  The  general obligations law is amended by adding a new section
   16  5-335 to read as follows:
   17    § 5-335. LIMITATION OF  NON-STATUTORY  REIMBURSEMENT  AND  SUBROGATION
   18  CLAIMS IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS.  (A) WHEN A PLAIN-
   19  TIFF SETTLES WITH ONE OR MORE DEFENDANTS IN AN ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJU-
   20  RIES,  MEDICAL,  DENTAL, OR PODIATRIC MALPRACTICE, OR WRONGFUL DEATH, IT
   21  SHALL BE CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED THAT THE SETTLEMENT DOES NOT INCLUDE  ANY
   22  COMPENSATION  FOR  THE COST OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, LOSS OF EARNINGS OR
   23  OTHER ECONOMIC LOSS TO THE EXTENT THOSE LOSSES OR EXPENSES HAVE BEEN  OR
   24  ARE OBLIGATED TO BE PAID OR REIMBURSED BY A BENEFIT PROVIDER, EXCEPT FOR
   25  THOSE  PAYMENTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS A STATUTORY RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT.
   26  BY ENTERING INTO ANY SUCH SETTLEMENT, A PLAINTIFF SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO
   27  HAVE TAKEN AN ACTION IN DEROGATION OF  ANY  NONSTATUTORY  RIGHT  OF  ANY
   28  BENEFIT  PROVIDER  THAT  PAID  OR  IS  OBLIGATED  TO PAY THOSE LOSSES OR
   29  EXPENSES; NOR SHALL A PLAINTIFF'S ENTRY INTO SUCH SETTLEMENT  CONSTITUTE
   30  A  VIOLATION  OF  ANY  CONTRACT  BETWEEN  THE PLAINTIFF AND SUCH BENEFIT
   31  PROVIDER.
   32    EXCEPT WHERE THERE IS A STATUTORY RIGHT  OF  REIMBURSEMENT,  NO  PARTY
   33  ENTERING  INTO SUCH A SETTLEMENT SHALL BE SUBJECT TO A SUBROGATION CLAIM
   34  OR CLAIM FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY A BENEFIT PROVIDER AND A BENEFIT  PROVIDER
   35  SHALL  HAVE NO LIEN OR RIGHT OF SUBROGATION OR REIMBURSEMENT AGAINST ANY
   36  SUCH SETTLING PARTY, WITH RESPECT TO THOSE LOSSES OR EXPENSES THAT  HAVE
   37  BEEN OR ARE OBLIGATED TO BE PAID OR REIMBURSED BY SAID BENEFIT PROVIDER.
   38    (B)  THIS  SECTION SHALL NOT APPLY TO A SUBROGATION CLAIM FOR RECOVERY
   39  OF  ADDITIONAL  FIRST-PARTY  BENEFITS  PROVIDED  PURSUANT   TO   ARTICLE
   40  FIFTY-ONE  OF  THE INSURANCE LAW. THE TERM "ADDITIONAL FIRST-PARTY BENE-
   41  FITS", AS USED IN THIS SUBDIVISION, SHALL HAVE THE SAME MEANING GIVEN IT
   42  IN SECTION 65-1.3 OF TITLE 11 OF THE CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
   43  STATE OF NEW YORK AS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS STATUTE.
   44    § 9. This act shall take effect immediately and  shall  apply  to  all
   45  actions  and  proceedings  commenced  on  or  after such date; provided,
   46  however, that sections four through eight of this act shall  also  apply
   47  to  any action or proceeding which was commenced prior to such effective
   48  date where, as of such date, either (a) a trial of the  issues  has  not
   49  yet  commenced,  or  (b)  the parties have not yet entered into a stipu-
   50  lation of settlement.
Effective Dates:

Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Part F of this act (the changes to CPLR § 4545) will take effect "immediately" upon the Governor's signature of this bill (which occurred on November 12, 2009) and will apply to all actions commenced on and after that date.

Sections 4, 5 (changes to CPLR Rule 4111), 6 (change to CPLR § 4213),7 (addition of General Obligations Law § 5-101[4]), and 8 (addition of General Obligations Law § 5-335) will also apply to any applicable action or proceeding that was commenced prior to November 12, 2009, (Governor's signing date) if as of such date either the trial had not yet commenced or the parties had not "entered into" (settlement memorialized in writing or one "spread on the record") a stipulation of settlement. 

For medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice actions commenced on and after July 26, 2003, the court's decision on future damages must be itemized in accordance with CPLR Rule 4111(d).

For actions brought to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death commenced on and after July 26, 2003, that are not medical, dental or podiatric malpractice actions, the court's decision on future damages must be itemized in accordance with the relettered CPLR Rule 4111(e).

Purpose of Part F:

When predecessor Senate Bill S6068 was passed by just the Senate back in July, the New York State Trial Lawyers Association website pronounced it a legislative victory:
NYSTLA is proud to announce that the New York State Senate voted to pass a mandate relief bill, S.6068 (Sampson), on July 17th, 2009, which includes an anti-subrogation provision. This is a major victory for the civil justice system and injured New Yorkers. The anti-subrogation provision amends the general obligations law to protect all settling plaintiffs and defendants in a personal injury action from certain unwarranted reimbursement and subrogation claims.

This bill will remedy recent, ill-advised Court of Appeals decisions such as Teichman v. Community Hosp. of Western Suffolk , 87 N.Y.2d 514 (1996), and Fasso v. Doerr, 12 N.Y.3d 80 (Feb. 24, 2009). These decisions incorrectly opened the door to benefits providers, such as health insurers, "double-dipping" by seeking reimbursement from settling defendants who have caused personal injuries to a plaintiff who has health insurance.
APIP Subrogation Exempted:

Notice that the new GOL § 5-335 specifically exempts subrogation claims for recovery of "additional first-party benefits" as provided for in Insurance Law Article 51 and defined by the prescribed APIP endorsement found at 11 NYCRR § 65-1.3.  This means that APIP subrogation claims are still fully viable. 

Property Damage Subrogation Claims Unaffected:

On its face, the new GOL § 5-335 will apply only to and limit non-statutory reimbursement and subrogation claims in personal injury and wrongful death actions, and, as to such actions, only insurers or entities qualifying as a "benefit provider" will be affected.  GOL § 5-101(4) will define a "benefit provider" as "any insurer, health maintenance organization, health benefit plan, preferred provider organization, employee benefit plan or other entity which provides for payment or reimbursement of health care expenses, health care services, disability payments, lost wage payments or any other benefits under a policy of insurance or contract with an individual or group."

GOL § 5-335 should not apply to insurers that afford first-party property coverage benefits to their insureds and then seek to exercise their subrogation rights because those insurers should not fall within the definition of a "benefit provider" under that section. 

Common Law Anti-Subrogation Rule Unaffected:

The new law should not affect what has come to be known as New York's common law "antisubrogation rule".  The common law rule operates as a party's liability defense based on coverage principles, not a recovery right of subrogation.

Monday, March 2, 2009

Settlement Between Injured Party and Tortfeasor Held Not to Extinguish Health Insurer's Equitable Subrogation Claim

HEALTH INSURANCE – EQUITABLE SUBROGATION – SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM – "MADE WHOLE" RULE – PERMISSIBLE INTERVENTION
Fasso v. Doerr

(Ct. Apps., decided 2/24/2009)


Attorneys who practice personal injury law in New York, pay attention. The New York Court of Appeals has given counsel for plaintiffs and defendants one more thing to consider before settling personal injury actions. Especially ones in which the health insurer of the injured party has been allowed to intervene.

When a person suffers personal injuries because of the wrongdoing of another and the injured party's health insurer pays for medical treatment, a cause of action for equitable subrogation accrues to the health insurer, allowing the insurer to seek recoupment of its expenditures. The issue before the New York Court of Appeals in this case was whether the injured party and the tortfeasor could agree to a settlement that extinguished the intervening insurer's subrogation rights. The Court concluded that the health insurer's subrogation claim in this case could not be discontinued without the health insurer's consent.

Paula Fasso received medical services from defendant Ralph Doerr, M.D., in 1996. She subsequently developed complications that required her to undergo a liver transplant. Approximately two years later, Mrs. Fasso and her husband commenced this action against Dr. Doerr and the hospital where he treated her, alleging that Dr. Doerr had committed medical malpractice. Mrs. Fasso required a second liver transplant in 2003, resulting in her medical and surgical expenses totaling approximately $780,000, all of which were paid by her health insurance carrier, Independent Health Association, Inc.

In 2005, IHA moved to intervene in the Fassos' medical malpractice action pursuant to CPLR 1013 in order to assert an equitable subrogation claim against Dr. Doerr for reimbursement of the payments made on Mrs. Fasso's behalf. IHA represented that it would "not unduly delay" the litigation or "prejudice the substantial rights of any party" if permitted to intervene. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants opposed IHA's motion, and Supreme Court therefore allowed IHA to become a party to the case.

The Fassos eventually sought summary judgment dismissing IHA's complaint for equitable subrogation. They contended that IHA could not expect to receive reimbursement from Dr. Doerr because Mrs. Fasso's damages exceeded the $2 million of malpractice coverage available to Dr. Doerr. Hence, the Fassos claimed that Mrs. Fasso could not be "made whole" in light of the coverage limits of the doctor's malpractice policies. Supreme Court denied the Fassos' motion to dismiss IHA's complaint.

Before the trial began, IHA informed Supreme Court that it would rely on the Fassos' proof of Dr. Doerr's alleged negligence and would present only one witness to establish the medical expenses. Mrs. Fasso was the first witness to testify and, the following morning, the attorneys for plaintiffs and the doctor advised the court that a settlement had been reached. Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiffs would receive $900,000, Dr. Doerr would not admit wrongdoing and IHA's equitable subrogation claim would be dismissed on the basis that Mrs. Fasso was not "made whole" since the settlement payment was less than her actual damages. IHA, which had not participated in the negotiations or agreed to the dismissal of its cause of action against Dr. Doerr, did not object to plaintiffs receiving the monetary payment, but it did contest the dismissal of its equitable subrogation claim because, after Dr. Doerr paid the $900,000 settlement, there remained $1.1 million in potential insurance coverage — an amount greater than the sum IHA sought in subrogation. IHA also moved for a mistrial so that it could obtain its own witnesses and evidence to prove Dr. Doerr's negligence.

Supreme Court denied IHA's request for a mistrial and approved the settlement between the Fassos and Dr. Doerr. Since Mrs. Fasso was not being paid the full amount of her damages, the court held that IHA's subrogation claim could not survive and sua sponte dismissed IHA's complaint. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed (46 AD3d 1358 [2007]), and the Court of Appeals granted leave to IHA to appeal and REVERSED.

The Court began by reviewing the basics of the equitable subrogation doctrine:
It is well established that when an insurer pays for losses sustained by its insured that were occasioned by a wrongdoer, the insurer is entitled to seek recovery of the monies it expended under the doctrine of equitable subrogation (citations omitted). Equitable subrogation is premised on two related concepts. First, that the party who causes injury or damage should be required to bear the loss by reimbursing the insurer for payments made on behalf of the injured party. Second, that the injured party should not recover twice for the same harm — once from its insurer and again from the wrongdoer (citation omitted). Therefore, if an injured party receives monies from the tortfeasor attributable to expenses that were paid by its insurer, the insurer may recoup its disbursements from its insured; but when the wrongdoer does not pay damages for an insured's medical expenses, generally the insurer, as subrogee, has been allowed to seek recovery directly from the tortfeasor (citation omitted).
The Court then noted that the "made whole" rule may serve to limit recovery under the doctrine of equitable subrogation:
If "the sources of recovery ultimately available are inadequate to fully compensate the insured for its losses, then the insurer — who has been paid by the insured to assume the risk of loss — has no right to share in the proceeds of the insured's recovery from the tortfeasor" (Winkelmann, 85 NY2d at 581). In other words, the insurer may seek subrogation against only those funds and assets that remain after the insured has been compensated. This designation of priority interests — referred to as the "made whole" rule — assures that the injured party's claim against the tortfeasor takes precedence over the subrogation rights of the insurer.
The Fassos and Dr. Doerr contended that the "made whole" rule applied to preclude IHA from pursuing equitable subrogation against Dr. Doerr because because plaintiffs settled for less than the total damages caused by Dr. Doerr's alleged negligence. The Court found that this argument misconstrued the made whole principle:
If the recovery the injured party receives, whether determined by settlement or verdict, is greater than the wrongdoer's assets and available insurance coverage, there is nothing left for the insurer to execute its subrogation rights against and the made whole rule prevents the insurer from sharing in the insured's judgment or recovery. But that is not the situation here. In this case, the made whole doctrine does not present an obstacle to the insurer's right to seek recoupment from the tortfeasor because the settlement between the Fassos and Dr. Doerr left a potential source of recovery — $1.1 million in remaining insurance coverage. Consequently, the made whole rule did not mandate dismissal of IHA's equitable subrogation claim merely because the Fassos decided to accept a settlement figure that did not completely compensate them for the full extent of their damages.
The operative question, then, is not whether the insured party settles for less than the total damages caused by the tortfeasor, but whether the settlement is for less than the tortfeasor's available insurance coverage, leaving a potential source of recovery for the equitable subrogee. If the latter, the made whole rule does not preclude the insurer from exercising it right of equitable subrogation.

The Fassos and Dr. Doerr also argued that their agreement to extinguish IHA's equitable subrogation cause of action was binding on IHA because an insurer-subrogee stands in the shoes of its insured subrogor and acquires only those rights that the insured possesses. The Court rejected this argument, as well:
The right to subrogation "accrue[s] upon payment of the loss" by the insurer (Federal Ins. Co. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 75 NY2d at 372) and it generally cannot be imperiled by the insured (see e.g. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 NY 37, 50 [1925]; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v Bekins Van Lines Co., 67 NY2d 901, 903 [1986]). Once an insurer has paid a claim and the tortfeasor knows or should have known that a right to subrogation exists, the wrongdoer and the insured cannot agree to terminate the insurer's claim without its consent and such an agreement cannot be asserted as a defense to the insurer's cause of action (see Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 240 NY at 50-51; see generally Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v Erie Ry. Co., 73 NY at 402-403; cf. Weinberg v Transamerica Ins. Co., 62 NY2d 379, 384 and n 4 [1984]). Hence, the provision of the settlement between the Fassos and Dr. Doerr that purported to bar IHA's equitable subrogation claim cannot be enforced and does not prevent IHA from proceeding to obtain reimbursement from Dr. Doerr for the payments it made for Mrs. Fasso's medical expenses as a result of the doctor's alleged negligence.
Notwithstanding its ruling on the survival of IHA's equitable subrogation claim, the Court of Appeals "f[ou]nd it necessary to comment on the procedural posture of this case." CPLR 1013 allows a party to request permission to intervene in a civil proceeding "when the person's claim or defense and the main action have a common question of law or fact." In exercising its discretion to grant or deny intervention, a trial court must "consider whether the intervention will unduly delay the determination of the action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party."

Noting that New York courts have disagreed on the issue of whether it is permissible to grant intervention to health insurers of injured parties in tort cases, the Court of Appeals observed:
The predominant view is that the participation by insurers in settlement negotiations creates conflicts of interest with plaintiffs, who may wish to accept settlements that do not allocate sufficient monies to cover all or part of the medical expenses, and discourages or prevents settlements since insurers will be inclined to object to anything less than full recovery of their expenditures (see Berry v St. Peter's Hosp. of City of Albany, 250 AD2d 63 [3d Dept 1998, Carpinello, J.], lv dismissed 92 NY2d 1045 [1999]; see also Marshall v 426-428 W. 46th St. Owners, Inc., 33 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2006]; Humbach v Goldstein, 229 AD2d 64 [2d Dept 1997], lv dismissed 91 NY2d 921 [1998]). Taking a contrary view, the Fourth Department has permitted discretionary intervention (see e.g. Oakes v Patel, 23 AD3d 1023 [4th Dept 2005]; Omiatek v Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 9 AD3d 831 [4th Dept 2004], lv dismissed 3 NY3d 738 [2004]).
The Court noted that "allowing an insurer to intervene inevitably complicates settlement negotiations over the tortfeasor's insurance coverage", but did not pass on the issue of whether intervention had properly been granted to IHA because neither the Fassos nor Dr. Doerr had opposed IHA's motion to intervene. Instead, in recognition of "spiraling health care costs and their effect on the availability and affordability of medical insurance", coupled with an uncertainty regarding how and when health insurers should assert their subrogation claims, the Court invited the New York State Legislature to reexamine the concept of permissible intervention under CPLR 1013 as it applies to personal injury actions involving a health insurer's claim of equitable subrogation.

Unless and until the New York State Legislature addresses permissible intervention by health insurers in personal injury actions, injured parties may opt to oppose their health insurers' motions to intervene. In this case, had IHA not been allowed to intervene, it could not have pursued its equitable subrogation claim directly, since the applicable statute of limitations had already run. If it had not been a plaintiff-intervenor, IHA likely would have been unable to prevent the parties' settlement from concluding the action.

Health insurers interested in preserving and pursuing their equitable subrogation claims should consider either commencing their own actions directly against tortfeasors within the applicable statute of limitations or seeking permissible intervention into their insureds' personal injury actions, especially if the applicable statute of limitations has run.