Showing posts with label Personal Umbrella. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Personal Umbrella. Show all posts

Saturday, June 4, 2022

"Personal Injury" (Defamation) Coverage under a PULP -- Depp v. Heard Defense Costs







From my LinkedIn post today (Sat., June 4, 2022):

I rarely learn anything useful from the New York Post, but this article reports that Amber Heard "had to switch legal representation and is relying on her homeowner’s #insurance policy to cover the cost of her attorneys in the case. The bill for Heard’s attorney has mostly been footed by The Travelers Companies, Inc under terms of the actress’s insurance policy, sources said." "Mostly" likely because Travelers would not be responsible for paying attorneys' fees and costs associated with the prosecution of Heard's $100 million counterclaim against Depp.

Most homeowners policies don't provide coverage for "personal injury", defined to include "injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses, but only if the offense was committed during the policy period: *** 4. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services[.]" Personal umbrella policies typically provide "personal injury" coverage. I'm guessing that the Travelers policy that provided defense costs is a PULP (personal umbrella liability policy) sitting above Heard's homeowners policy.

The article is probably correct, however, in pointing out that Heard's policy with Travelers will likely NOT provide indemnification coverage for Johnny Depp's $10 million compensatory damages verdict against Heard. PULPs typically exclude personal injury coverage for:
"Personal injury":
a.  Caused by or at the direction of an "insured" with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict "personal injury";
b.  Arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the "insured" with knowledge of its falsity;
c.  Arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period;
d.   Arising out of a criminal act committed by or at the direction of an "insureds"; or
e.  Sustained by any person as a result of an offense directly or indirectly related to the employment of this person by the "insured"[.]
The jury's positive finding on each of the prima facie elements of defamation on the three statements in Heard's op ed piece likely triggers at least one of these exclusionary provisions--"b."--and possibly two of them--"a." and "b."

I'm no bankruptcy lawyer but I do know that judgments based on intentional torts, like libel with malice aforethought, are NOT dischargeable in bankruptcy.

#personalinjury #defamation #insurancecoverageinthenews


Sunday, January 21, 2018

New York Court of Appeals Now Tweeting Insurance Coverage Decisions

Image result for twitter
No, not really. That's just a click-baiting title.

But seriously, the court's issuance on December 14, 2017 of 259-character and 219-character decisions in insurance coverage cases could have fit within Twitter's new 280-character limit.  Here are the cases and why they're so short.

Section 500.11 of the New York Court of Appeals' Rules of Practice -- Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals

22 NYCRR § 500.11(a) provides in pertinent part that "[o]n its own motion, the Court [of Appeals] may review selected appeals by an alternative procedure. Such appeals shall be determined on the intermediate appellate court record or appendix and briefs, the writings in the courts below and additional letter submissions on the merits."

In other words, no record, no briefs and no oral argument to the Court of Appeals.  And a faster and likely shorter decision.

What cases make the alternative review cut, you ask?  Per Rule 500.11(b), the Court of Appeals may select cases for such alternative review based on:
  1. questions of discretion, mixed questions of law and fact or affirmed findings of fact, which are subject to a limited scope of review; 
  2. recent, controlling precedent; 
  3. narrow issues of law not of statewide importance; 
  4. unpreserved issues of law; 
  5. a party's request for such review; or
  6. other appropriate factors.
By my count (actually Google Scholar's count),  the New York Court of Appeals has invoked Rule 500.11 six previous times in insurance coverage cases:
Here are the Court of Appeals' latest Tweet-sized insurance coverage decisions:

NO-FAULT – LOSS OF EARNINGS – SPECULATIVE NATURE OF CLAIM
Freligh v. Government Employees Insurance Company
(Ct. Apps., decided 12/14/2017)

Loss of earnings claim.  One of those "Oh, I know I wasn't employed at the time of the accident but I was just about to start a new job" kind of claim.  Regulation 68 permits an eligible injured person to recover "demonstrated future earnings reasonably projected" (11 NYCRR 65-3.16[b][3]).

At the time of the December 23, 2012 MVA, the plaintiff, who had worked in the automotive parts and repair industry for a number of years, had been unemployed for approximately seven months. In January 2013 plaintiff submitted an application for no-fault benefits.  With respect to the LOE portion of his application, plaintiff indicated that he "was due to start [a] new job" but had been unable to work since the MVA  as a result of the injuries that he had sustained in the accident. Plaintiff further indicated that details regarding his position, including his salary and the employer's name and address, would be provided.

Plaintiff thereafter provided GEICO with a copy of an employment application dated December 15, 2012, which purportedly reflected that plaintiff had been offered a $2,000 a week job at a failing auto parts business owned by plaintiff's friend of 15 years who, the record showed, (1) had previously pleaded guilty to insurance fraud and offering a false instrument, (2) had made false sworn statements in regard to the bankruptcy proceeding of a corporation, (3) had initiated that bankruptcy proceeding as a "ruse" to forestall creditors and (4) had paid his wife a salary from the parts business while she was a student at Columbia University for her "learning purposes."

In reversing Supreme Court's denial of GEICO's summary judgment motion, the three-justice majority of the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that "material evidence established as a matter of law that the projection that plaintiff would have received $2,000 a week from the parts business is unreasonable[.]"

Invoking its alternative review authority under Rule 500.11, the New York Court of of Appeals REVERSED the Appellate Division's order and reinstated the complaint.  The Court's 259-character (not counting spaces) decision:
On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules, order reversed, with costs, and case remitted to the Appellate Division, Third Department, for consideration of issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that court. Triable issues of fact exist as to plaintiff's claim for lost wages.
That's it.  Triable issues of fact regarding the EIP's LOE claim for the jury to hear and decide.  Appellate Division order reversed.  The  Court of Appeal's seventh Rule 500.11 alternative review of an insurance coverage case.  

PERSONAL UMBRELLA – CANCELLATION – DIVISIBILITY
Garcia v. Government Employees Insurance Company
(Ct. Apps., decided 12/14/2017)

Appeal from another 3-2 decision at the Appellate Division (Second Department), but GEICO won this one at the Court of Appeals.

The insured had a $1 million personal umbrella policy with GEICO; the annual premium for that policy was $306.  On renewal the insured asked GEICO to increase the umbrella policy limit to $2 million, which GEICO did so, resulting in an increased premium of $199 for the umbrella policy.  When the insured paid only the prior year's premium of $306 GEICO cancelled the umbrella policy effective 12:01 a.m. on May 19, 2006.  As unluck would have it, the insured's vehicle was involved in a motor vehicle accident later that day in which the plaintiff, Garcia, was injured.

In pursuing coverage under the umbrella policy, Garcia argued that the umbrella policy's declarations were ambiguous, that GEICO's insured had made a payment sufficient to keep $1 million in umbrella coverage in force, and that the the umbrella policy's first and second million dollars of umbrella coverage were divisible.

The 3-2 majority of the Appellate Division, Second Department, disagreed:
Next, because there is no ambiguity in what Rakowski contracted for — $2,000,000 in coverage, as stated in the Amended Declarations of the policy — there is likewise no ambiguity in GEICO's notice of cancellation, which referred to the policy number of Rakowski's umbrella policy. The cancellation notice could only have pertained to Rakowski's coverage of $2,000,000, which was the only coverage the policy provided for the policy period (see First Sav. & Loan Assn. of Jersey City, N. J. v American Home Assur. Co., 29 NY2d at 300).
Invoking its alternative review authority under Rule 500.11, the New York Court of of Appeals AFFIRMED the Appellate Division's order, with costs.  The Court's 219-character (not counting spaces) decision:
On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules, order affirmed, with costs. There is no ambiguity in the policy as to coverage or divisibility. The parties contracted for $2 million of coverage. Plaintiff's remaining contention lacks merit.
That's it.  No ambiguity.  Insurer wins.  The  Court of Appeal's eighth Rule 500.11 alternative review of an insurance coverage case.  

Monday, December 7, 2015

Primary vs. Umbrella -- No Duty, No Standing, No Suit

PERSONAL AUTO – PRIMARY POLICY – UMBRELLA POLICY – STANDING – EQUITABLE SUBROGATION – VOLUNTARY PAYMENT
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co.
2nd Dept., decided 11/25/2015)

You probably know that an umbrella insurer may sue and maintain an action against a primary insurer, but what about the other way around?  Not in this case.

Freier had a primary personal auto policy with GEICO and an umbrella policy with RLI.  After an auto accident, GEICO undertook to defend Freier in a personal injury action against her.  RLI disclaimed coverage based on late notice.  GEICO eventually paid $200,000 more than its policy limit to settle the action against Freier and commenced this action against RLI for reimbursement of that amount, seeking to challenge RLI's disclaimer.

In AFFIRMING Supreme Court's order granting RLI's motion to dismiss the complaint, the Second Department, Appellate Division, held
As the Supreme Court properly concluded, GEICO did not have standing to seek that relief. ... Here, it is undisputed that the coverage provided by the RLI policy was excess to GEICO's policy and, thus, RLI's duty to indemnify the Freiers was not triggered until coverage under GEICO's policy was exhausted. ... Therefore, GEICO did not stand to benefit from the RLI policy, depriving it of standing to seek a declaration of RLI's duty to indemnify under that policy... Accordingly, the court properly granted RLI's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. 
The Second Department also held that: (1) GEICO failed to demonstrate the existence of any duty running from RLI, the excess carrier, to GEICO, the primary insurer, with respect to RLI's coverage determination; and (2) contrary to GEICO's contention, the doctrine of equitable subrogation cannot be invoked where, as here, the payments sought to be recovered were voluntary.

Monday, August 17, 2009

Personal Umbrella Insurer Found to Have Standing to Commence Declaratory Judgment Action to Challenge Disclaimer of Homeowners Insurer

HOMEOWNERS – PERSONAL UMBRELLA – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION – STANDING
RLI Ins. Co. v. Steely
(2nd Dept., decided 8/4/2009)

RLI Insurance Company insured William Steely under a personal umbrella policy.  Steely had a homeowners policy with New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company.  Steely sought liability insurance coverage for a boating accident under both policies.  Based on its conclusion that Steely owned the boat in question on the accident date, NYCM denied coverage under Steely's homeowners based on a policy exclusion.  RLI then commenced this declaratory judgment action to challenge NYCM's denial, contending that Steely did not own the boat on the date of the accident, and that any coverage provided by RLI's umbrella policy was excess to the coverage provided by NYCM's homeowners policy.  NYCM moved to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211(a)(3), arguing that RLI lacked legal standing to challenge NYCM's coverage denial.  Westchester Supreme granted NYCM's motion, and RLI appealed. 

In REVERSING the order dismissing RLI's complaint, the Second Department held:
We find that the plaintiff has standing to challenge NY Mutual's disclaimer of coverage to its insured. "A plaintiff need not be privy to an insurance contract to commence a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights and obligations of the respective parties, so long as the plaintiff stands to benefit from the policy" (Mortillaro v Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 285 AD2d 586, 587). Here, the plaintiff clearly stands to benefit from NY Mutual's policy.