Mateyunas v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
(Sup. Ct., Queens Co., decided 7/16/2015)
Plaintiff's residence was damaged in a fire in 2011 while insured under a policy of homeowners insurance issued by the defendant. Under the policy defendant was obligated to pay no more in replacement cost coverage than the least of:
(a) the limit of liability under the policy that applied to the building;An appraisal of plaintiff's dwelling loss was conducted, resulting in an appraisal ACV award of $400,008.90, and a RCV award of $451,232.98. At some unspecified time prior to the two-year anniversary of the fire defendant paid a total of $415,232.98 to the plaintiff for his dwelling loss. Plaintiff did not, however, repair or replace the damaged dwelling prior to the two-year fire anniversary. He sued just within that two-year period, however, alleging that defendant owed him more monies under the dwelling, personal property, and ALE coverages of his policy with defendant. Both plaintiff and defendant moved for summary judgment.
(b) the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for like construction and use on the same premises; or
(c) the necessary amount actually spent to repair or replace the damaged building.
In GRANTING the defendant insurer's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's dwelling loss claim, the Supreme Court held:
Defendant has paid plaintiff the amount of $415,232.98 on plaintiff’s claim for loss to his dwelling, and asserts that no further amount is due, as plaintiff has been paid the actual cash value of the dwelling as determined by the umpire. Defendant contends that the language of the Policy permits the withholding of the difference between the actual cash value and the replacement cost until the repair or replacement is completed, because only at that time could defendant ascertain whether the actual cash value or the amount spent on repairing or replacing the property is the lesser amount to which plaintiff is entitled. Defendant further contends that the replacement of the dwelling was not completed within the two-year-from-date-of-loss period required by the Policy, and that plaintiff has not demonstrated the actual cost of the replacement to be in excess of the amount already paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled, by the unreserved terms of the policy, to the replacement amount as set by the umpire; that the two-year period is unreasonable and he was entitled to notification by defendant of such limited period; and that his actual expenses exceeded the amount already paid to him, as evidenced by the bills, checks and credit card receipts he included, for the first time, in his opposition/reply papers.
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The court agrees with the moving parties herein that the Policy terms regarding dwelling loss are unambiguous. Pursuant to the Policy, plaintiff would be entitled to payment, of up to the amount of the replacement cost loss, upon his completion of the replacement of the dwelling within two years and his submission of proof of the costs of replacement in excess of the actual cash loss to the dwelling. Otherwise, plaintiff would be entitled only to the actual cash loss to the dwelling, which amount has already been received by plaintiff. Plaintiff’s contention that he is entitled to the stated replacement cost loss recovery purely by reason of his having maintained a “replacement loss” policy is without merit. Plaintiff does not deny that he failed to complete the replacement of the dwelling within the requisite two-year period, nor has he shown that his expenses incurred in replacing the dwelling exceeded the amount already paid to him. His introduction of the untimely, unexplained, and unsworn-to photocopies of bills, checks and credit card statements are inadmissible to evidence entitlement to summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Seidman v Industrial Recycling Props., Inc., 52 AD3d 678 ; see also CPLR 4533[a]; Daguerre S.A.R.L. v Rabizadeh, 112 AD3d 876 ; Matell Contracting Co., Inc. v Fleetwood Park Development, LLC, 111 AD3d 681 ). Plaintiff has failed to submit an affidavit of a person with first-hand knowledge of the facts, and counsel’s reply affirmation herein, made without asserting any personal knowledge of the facts, did not satisfy the statutory requirements of CPLR 3212, because it did not serve as a vehicle to submit admissible documentary evidence[.]The court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's ALE claim, holding that neither party carried its burden of eliminating all material issues of triable fact.
Note: this is an unreported decision from a trial-level New York state court. Cite and rely on it accordingly.