Showing posts with label COVID-19. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COVID-19. Show all posts

Saturday, June 26, 2021

⚠ NEW YORK COVID-19 #BUSINESSINTERRUPTION CASE UPDATE ⚠

The "score" in New York on COVID-19 #businessinterruption coverage lawsuits, where "direct physical loss" or "direct physical damage" was at issue, now stands at 23-0 for insurers (18 federal, 5 state).

Since my last update, here are the four recent decisions: 
Manhattan-based policyholder in the business of office project management and furniture installation, sued its commercial property insurer for business income and civil authority coverage for losses allegedly stemming from its March 2020 forced closure during COVID-19.  The policy's business interruption coverages required “direct physical loss of or damage to property” and the policy included a “Microbe Exclusion” that included viruses. 

In GRANTING the insurer's motion to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, the court ruled:

Critically, Plaintiff’s argument also fails to consider the extensive case law that has developed in New York on this exact issue over the past year, which provides that loss of use caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is not physical damage. Unfortunately, Plaintiff is only one of numerous businesses that suffered immense income loss after shutting its doors during the pandemic. Many of those other businesses have brought materially identical actions in New York seeking business impact coverage from their insurance providers. New York courts have consistently maintained that “direct physical loss of or damage” language requires physical damage to invoke coverage, and that loss of use due to the pandemic does not constitute physical damage when the covered property was physically unharmed by the virus. * * *

As in the many analogous cases that have been brought in New York courts over the past year, the Court concludes here that the plain meaning of “direct physical loss or damage” unambiguously requires physical damage to the covered property to invoke coverage and that loss of usage does not rise to the level of physical damage. Plaintiff has failed to allege such loss or damage occurred, given that Plaintiff’s office remained physically intact and unharmed throughout its closure, other than having its doors closed to the public. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to coverage under the Business Property Coverage terms of the Policy. * * *

The language of the Policy is unambiguous and bars Plaintiff from coverage. The Business Property Coverage terms of the Policy cover direct physical damage or loss, and the Civil Authority Coverage terms of the Policy cover losses when civil authorities prohibit entrance onto the covered property due to direct physical damage to neighboring properties. Plaintiff has failed to allege that either of those occurred, and instead only alleges loss of use and limited access to the covered property due to the threat of COVID-19. Furthermore, Plaintiff is not entitled to coverage because the Policy’s Microbe Exclusion explicitly excludes coverage for damages caused by "any virus," which includes the COVID-19 virus. 

Plaintiffs, an office equipment supplier and a dental practice, sued their commercial property insurers for business interruption coverage for losses allegedly stemming from their March 2020 forced closure during COVID-19.  The policies' business interruption coverages required “direct physical loss of or damage to property”, but did not contain a virus exclusion.

In GRANTING the insurers' motion for judgment on the pleadings (post-answer motion to dismiss), the court ruled:

Plaintiffs' policies provide coverage for business interruptions caused by "direct physical loss or damage" to their insured premises or due to orders of a civil authority issued in response to  direct physical loss or damage" to nearby property that restricted Plaintiffs' access to their premises. Plaintiffs argue that they suffered covered losses because the presence of the coronavirus at or  near the insured premises constitutes "direct physical loss of or physical damage."

To make this argument, Plaintiffs point to the existence of the so-called "Virus Exclusion" and the "Virus Limitation": standard fmm endorsements developed by the ISO that exclude or limit an insured's otherwise available coverage when the conditions of the endorsement are met. * * * Plaintiffs argue that this omission constitutes an "express acknowledgement by [Defendants] that a virus is capable of causing 'direct physical loss of or damage to' property." (Doc. 78 at 18.)  from this assertion, Plaintiffs jump to the conclusion that the presence of the coronavirus constitutes direct physical loss or damage.

However, Plaintiffs' reliance on the Virus Exclusion and Virus Limitation is misplaced. Regardless of whether a virus could cause direct physical loss of or damage to property, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the coronavirus caused direct physical loss or damage to their premises or property in the vicinity of their premises. The Virus Exclusion and Virus Limitation operate by limiting or excluding coverage that would otherwise be available under an insured's policy; that is, they limit rather than expand coverage. Consequently, the endorsement becomes relevant only if an insured experiences an otherwise "covered loss." In that case, the Virus Exclusion or the Virus Limitation would limit the insured's recovery for the otherwise covered loss. In Plaintiffs' case, however, the omission of the Virus Exclusion and the Virus Limitation from Plaintiffs' policies is irrelevant because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that they suffered "direct physical loss or damage" to their property.

Many courts applying New York law, including this one, have already concluded that business closures due to the presence of the coronavirus or due to New York State executive orders do not constitute "direct physical loss of or damage to" property. See Kim-Chee LLC v. Phil. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-1136, 2021 WL 1600831, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. April 23, 2021); id. at *3 ( citing cases applying New York law). Relying on longstanding New York precedent, these courts have ruled that the phrase "direct physical loss or damage" is unambiguous and requires physical alteration of property. Kim-Chee, 2021 WL 1600831, at *4 (applying Roundabout Theatre Co., 751 N.Y.S.2d at 8).

The presence of the coronavirus does not physically alter property in a permanent manner. In this respect, the virus is different from other physical or chemical contaminants that have been found to cause "direct physical loss or damage" to property. Id. at *5 (citing gasoline seepage, lead contamination, exposed asbestos, pervasive odor, and chemical or bacterial contamination as examples of"[c]ontamination of a structure that seriously impairs or destroys its function," thereby "qualify[ing] as direct physical loss"). Instead, the coronavirus poses a temporary health hazard to the occupants of a building, whose threat to human health dissipates with the passage of time. Many courts, including this one, have determined that merely temporary contamination does not qualify as "direct physical loss or damage." Id. (citing dust from road construction, mold or bacteria that could be eliminated by cleaning, and the controlled presence of asbestos as examples of such "short-lived contamination). * * *

In this case, the alleged presence of the coronavirus has not caused a permanent change to Plaintiffs' properties or decreased the value and function of those properties. Instead, New York State executive orders issued in response to the coronavirus temporarily deprived Plaintiffs of the ability to use their properties for their intended purpose. Because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the presence of the coronavirus caused "direct physical loss of or damage to" their insured premises or nearby property, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for breach of contract under either their business interruption coverage or civil authority coverage. Insuring Defendants are therefore entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.

The court also granted judgment on the pleadings dismissing plaintiffs' New York General Business Law § 349 cause of action, holding that that plaintiffs cannot "establish that they  suffered injury as a result of' the defendants' conduct-as required to state a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law§ 349-because they did not plausibly allege "direct physical loss of or damage to" their insured property.

Plaintiffs, self-storage facilities, sued their commercial property insurer for business interruption coverage for losses allegedly stemming from their March 2020 forced closure during COVID-19.  The policies' business interruption coverages required “direct physical loss" of property, but did not contain a virus exclusion.

In GRANTING the insurer's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, the New York State Supreme Court, Erie County, held:

The Court agrees with Defendant that there are no facts, only conclusions, to support Plaintiffs' claims. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden and that dismissal is required. The complaint is void of any evidence to support the bald conclusion that the coronavirus caused an actual covered loss (physical or otherwise) under the subject policies. * * * Here, the subject policy language is specific, clear, and unambiguous. The insurance company covers losses "directly resulting from interruption of your business operations because of a business property loss insured under this policy." Mura Affirmation at ¶ 13. "Physical loss" and "business property'' are not ambiguous terms. Those are the terms included in the Policy and the Court will not now, as noted above, "rewrite the contract or impose additional terms which the parties failed to insert." Supra.

The court also dismissed the complaint’s New York General Business Law § 349 deceptive acts and practices cause of action, holding that “[t]he case before this Court likewise stems from a private dispute outside the ambit of §349 of the General Business Law.” 

Plaintiff, a Manhattan restaurant, sued its commercial property insurer for business interruption coverage for losses allegedly stemming from its March 2020 forced closure during COVID-19.  The policy's business interruption coverages required “direct physical loss of or damage to  property" and did contain a virus exclusion.

In GRANTING the insurer's motion to dismiss with prejudice; the court held:

The Complaint does not allege that the Café suffered a ‘direct physical loss’ of property that would provide for business interruption coverage under the Policy….The Complaint does not plausibly allege the Café suffered a loss covered under the Civil Authority Provision….The Court concludes that the Virus Exclusion is unambiguous and excludes the coverage sought by the Café.

For an updated listing of all 23 New York COVID-19 #businessinterruption cases decided to date, click the image below.  

 

Monday, June 21, 2021

Toll or Suspension? The New York Appellate Division, Second Department, Weighs In

CIVIL PROCEDURE – COVID-19 EXECUTIVE ORDERS – SUSPENSION OR TOLL?

Brash v. Richards
(2nd Dept., 6/2/2021)

I've posed the question here before (several times, as a matter of fact): 
👉Did Governor Cuomo's COVID-19 Executive Order 202.8 (and its extensions) suspend or toll  prescribed procedural time limitations  in New York?👈

An Albany Law School professor said toll.
A sitting New York Supreme Court justice opined suspension in a law journal article.
A New York Court of Claim judge ruled toll in a February 2021 decision.

And now, the Appellate Division, Second Department, has, in the context of ruling on a respondent's motion to dismiss an appellant's appeal as untimely taken, ruled TOLL (and nicely explained the difference between a "toll" and a "suspension" of a limitation period):
The respondent Neil M. Richards moves, and the respondent Harrison Mu separately moves, to dismiss this appeal as untimely taken and on the ground that no appeal lies from an order determining a motion in limine. These motions raise the issue of whether a series of executive orders issued by Governor Andrew Cuomo, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, constitute a toll or, alternatively, a suspension of filing deadlines applicable to litigation in the New York courts. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the subject executive orders constitute a toll of such filing deadlines. As a result, this appeal was timely taken. 
A toll suspends the running of the applicable period of limitation for a finite time period, and "[t]he period of the toll is excluded from the calculation of the [relevant time period]" (Chavez v Occidental Chem. Corp., 35 NY3d 492, 505 n 8; see Foy v State of New York, 71 Misc 3d 605 [Ct Cl]). "Unlike a toll, a suspension does not exclude its effective duration from the calculation of the relevant time period. Rather, it simply delays expiration of the time period until the end date of the suspension" (Foy v State of New York, 71 Misc 3d at 608). 

In this case, a copy of the order appealed from was served upon the appellant, with written notice of its entry, on October 2, 2020. CPLR 5513(a) provides that an appeal must be taken within 30 days of service of a copy of the order or judgment appealed from and written notice of its entry. The appellant served and filed a notice of appeal on November 10, 2020. According to the respondents, the notice of appeal was untimely served and filed, because, in their view, Governor Cuomo suspended filing deadlines in civil litigation in the New York courts until November 3, 2020. In contrast, the appellant argues that Governor Cuomo tolled such filing deadlines, meaning that the appellant had 30 days from November 3, 2020, to serve and file the notice of appeal. As a result, the appellant maintains that the notice of appeal, served and filed on November 10, 2020, was timely. Executive Law § 29-a(1) provides that the Governor "may by executive order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster." 

Executive Law § 29-a(2)(d) provides that any such order "may provide for the alteration or modification of the requirements of such statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule or regulation suspended, and may include other terms and conditions." 

On March 20, 2020 Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8), which provided: 
"I hereby temporarily suspend or modify, for the period from the date of this Executive Order through April 19, 2020 the following: 

"In accordance with the directive of the Chief Judge of the State to limit court operations to essential matters during the pendency of the COVID-19 health crisis, any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to the criminal procedure law, the family court act, the civil practice law and rules, the court of claims act, the surrogate's court procedure act, and the uniform court acts, or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof, is hereby tolled from the date of this executive order until April 19, 2020."
Governor Cuomo later issued a series of nine subsequent executive orders that extended the suspension or tolling period, eventually through November 3, 2020 (see Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos. 202.14, 202.28, 202.38, 202.48, 202.55, 202.55.1, 202.60, 202.67, 202.72 [9 NYCRR 8.202.14, 8.202.28, 8.202.38, 8.202.48, 8.202.55, 8.202.55.1, 8.202.60, 8.202.67, 8.202.72]). These subsequent executive orders either stated that the Governor "hereby continue[s] the suspensions, and modifications of law, and any directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive," made in the prior executive orders (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos. 202.14, 202.28, 202.38, 202.48, 202.67, 202.72 [9 NYCRR 8.202.14, 8.202.28, 8.202.38, 8.202.48, 8.202.67, 8.202.72]) or contained nearly identical language to that effect (see Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos. 202.55, 202.55.1, 202.60 [9 NYCRR 8.202.55, 8.202.55.1, 8.202.60]). While most of the subsequent executive orders did not use the word "toll," Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.67 (9 NYCRR 8.202.67) issued on October 5, 2020, provided that the: 
"suspension in Executive Order 202.8, as modified and extended in subsequent Executive Orders, that tolled any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to the criminal procedure law, the family court act, the civil practice law and rules, the court of claims act, the surrogate's court procedure act, and the uniform court acts, or by any statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof, is hereby continued, as modified by prior executive orders, provided however, for any civil case, such suspension is only effective until November 3, 2020, and after such date any such time limit will no longer be tolled." 
Finally, Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.72 (9 NYCRR 8.202.72), issued on November 3, 2020, reiterated that the "toll" would no longer be in effect as of November 4, 2020 (see Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.72 [9 NYCRR 8.202.72]). 

Governor Cuomo's March 20, 2020 executive order, Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8), expressly and plainly provided that the subject time limits were "hereby tolled," and two of the subsequent executive orders referred to the temporary alternation of the subject time limits as a "toll[ ]" (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos. 202.67, 202.72 [9 NYCRR 8.202.67, 8.202.72]; see Foy v State of New York, 71 Misc 3d 605; Kugel v Broadway 280 Park Fee LLC, Jan. 28, 2021 at 17, col 2, 2021 NYLJ LEXIS 25 [Sup Ct, NY County]). 

The respondents contend that even though Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8) purported to toll the limitations periods, Governor Cuomo did not have the statutory authority to do so, as Executive Law § 29-a, while expressly granting the Governor the authority to suspend statutes, does not expressly grant the Governor the authority to "toll" them. This contention is unpersuasive. As stated above, Executive Law § 29-a(2)(d) provides that an order issued pursuant thereto "may provide for the alteration or modification of the requirements of such statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule or regulation suspended, and may include other terms and conditions." This language in Executive Law § 29-a(2)(d) indicates that the Governor is authorized to do more than just "suspend" statutes during a state disaster emergency; he or she may "alter[ ]" or "modif[y]" the requirements of a statute, and a tolling of time limitations contained in such statute is within that authority (see Foy v State of New York, 71 Misc 3d 605). 

Furthermore, although the seven executive orders issued after Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8) did not use the word "toll," those executive orders all either stated that the Governor "hereby continue[s] the suspensions, and modifications of law, and any directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive," made in the prior executive orders (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos. 202.14, 202.28, 202.38, 202.48 [9 NYCRR 8.202.14, 8.202.28, 8.202.38, 8.202.48]) or contained nearly identical language to that effect (see Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos. 202.55, 202.55.1, 202.60 [9 NYCRR 8.202.55, 8.202.55.1, 8.202.60]). Since the tolling of a time limitation contained in a statute constitutes a modification of the requirements of such statute within the meaning of Executive Law § 29-a(2)(d), these subsequent executive orders continued the toll that was put in place by Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8). 

Therefore, the subject executive orders tolled the time limitation contained in CPLR 5513(a) for the taking of an appeal until November 3, 2020. Accordingly, the notice of appeal, which was served and filed on November 10, 2020, well within 30 days of November 3, 2020, was timely. 

In addition, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the order appealed from is appealable as of right, as it decided motions made upon notice and affected a substantial right of the parties (see CPLR 5701[a][2][v]; Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 16 AD3d 648, affd 7 NY3d 434). 

 Accordingly, we deny the respective motions to dismiss the appeal.
That should settle the issue, no?  

Why should you care if you're a property or casualty insurer doing business in New York?  (Hint: the answer has something to do with when reserves can be taken down.)

Next up: 
PPTL accrual before, during and after🠞what's the deadline?  
PPTL expiration during and after🠞what's the extended deadline?

Is anyone interested in a follow-up virtual meeting to go over how to calculate New York's COVID-19 toll?  #itsnotjustadding229days #letmeknowinthecomments

Sunday, June 6, 2021

COVID-19 Business Interruption Coverage Cases Decided Under New York Law -- 18-0 for Insurers

June 6, 2021 ~~ To date, 18 courts (14 federal/4 state) applying New York law have issued decisions on motions in COVID-19 business interruption coverage cases.  Click the image below for a list of those cases.  Each case name is hyperlinked to its decision.  

18-0 for insurers.  

Still waiting for the court's decision of my client's motion to dismiss the THILL 13014, LLC et al. v. Finger Lakes Fire & Casualty Company Erie County Supreme Court case.   


Wednesday, November 25, 2020

So When Can I Close My File? Calculating New York's COVID-19 Toll

 A claim handling client asked me today on what date the statute of limitations for a third-party personal injury claim that would have expired on July 11, 2020 if New York's COVID-19 toll (if it was a toll and not a suspension--see my previous posts on this blog) had not been put in place now expires?  

The answer can be found on Slide 33 of my November 3, 2020 presentation:


So the answer is?  February 25, 2021.  

  • The number of days from March 20, 2020 to and including July 11, 2020 is 114.
  • 114 days after November 3, 2020 is February 25, 2021.  
Easy peasy.  Something else you can be thankful for tomorrow. 

Stay safe and well, everyone, and have a happy (if socially distant) Thanksgiving.

P.S.  I used two websites/services to make these calculations:

Monday, November 23, 2020

The Key to Winning COVID-19 Business Interruption Lawsuits?

I was interviewed last Friday and quoted this morning in Jim Sams' article for the Claims Journal, entitled "The Key to Winning COVID Business-Interruption Claims: Say the Virus is Present".

Sandwiched between two policyholder attorneys, I made some points and said some words on the subject of the developing and refined strategies of policyholder attorneys to keep their clients' COVID-19 business interruption lawsuits from being dismissed on pre-answer dispositive motions.  

I said when I posted that article to LinkedIn that I'm still trying to get my head around policyholder attorney Chip Merlin's "absurd" argument. 

Absurd for policyholder attorneys to allege presence of the virus, or for insurer's to require that policyholders prove it? Listen for yourself and please tell me if you understand Chip's argument.

Then be sure to read my comment to the Claims Journal article.  

What do you think?  Is alleging presence of the virus on property "the key"?  I know of some federal judges who don't think so. 

COVID-19 Business Interruption Analytics -- Metrics for Six Dozen Litigation Rulings (To Date)

 It was in mid-April that I got the call.  I was being drafted to a team of attorneys from over a dozen jurisdictions to defend one of my insurer clients in what was expected to be an incoming tsunami of COVID-19 business interruption lawsuits.  For a seasoned insurance coverage attorney like me, this was my most recent call-up to The Bigs.  The Show.  The reason I spent all those formative coverage attorney years parsing sentences and hunting for the elusive Oxford comma.   

Now seven months and three, fully briefed, pre-answer motions to dismiss (actually four--moved twice in one case) later, I could tell you everything you never wanted to know about the meaning of DPLOODT (direct physical loss of or damage to) property, "loss" and "damage", "of" and "to", and whether a virus is alive or dead or neither and why it might matter to a policyholder's business interruption claim.

But not in this post.  Instead, I'll skip to and share with you the "scorecard" of sorts I've developed for cataloging and tracking the 72 COVID-19 business interruption ("BI" to the cool, commercial property kids) court rulings to date:


Now, if you had been following me all along on LinkedIn, you would already have these metrics.  I've lost count how many times since April I've used the #businessinterrution and #covidBIlitigation hashtags on my LinkedIn posts (but you can count them if you want, in no particular and discernable order, by clicking here).  

I know you're wondering how I keep all these stats or metrics, right?  Easy (not really).  Thank Microsoft and the sortability (not a real word) of the excellent Excel spreadsheet.  Et voilà:


The image above clicks to its PDF source, but for the real spreadsheet geeks who know what insights custom sorting can reveal, I offer you the sortable Excel spreadsheet, itself.  All case rulings are clickable through to PDF documents residing in my Dropbox folder.  If you want updated versions of the rulings metrics and spreadsheet, follow me on LinkedIn and watch for my weekly postings.  

Please feel free to share the rulings metrics, sortable spreadsheet and Dropbox folder link with whomever might find them interesting and useful.  

And stay safe and well, everyone.  

Monday, November 2, 2020

Toll or Nothing -- Free Webinar on November 3, 2020 to Review & Discuss NY's "COVID-19 Toll"

Join us on Tuesday, November 3, 2020 at 2:00 PM ET for a free webinar to review and discuss NY's "COVD-19 Toll", set to expire on November 3, 2020.

Topics will include:
  • toll vs. suspension: what's the difference?
  • Executive Orders 202, 202.8, 202.14, 202.28, 202.38, 202.48, 202.55, 202.55.1, 202.60, and 202.67.  
  • scope of the toll or suspension -- what things other than SOLs does this apply to?
  • toll or suspension -- which is it?
  • if a toll -- what happens: four scenarios
  • if a suspension -- what happens: four scenarios
  • applicability to time limits prescribed by:
    • regulations?
    • contracts?
We're going to run this webinar  on Microsoft Teams.  If you'd like to attend, click the link below.  You will not need to install any apps or software if you don't want to; you can attend the webinar via your computer's Internet browser of choice.  Join us and watch and listen in.  I'll have a Q&A at the end of the program.  See you then.  


Thursday, October 29, 2020

*** COVID-19 BI LITIGATION RULINGS BY THE NUMBERS *** (through Oct. 29, 2020)

I have seen a "scorecard that, together with the cases that I and others on LinkedIn have reported, tallies the COVID-19 business interruption rulings to date as 35-13 in favor of insurers. 

>>  The FEDERAL/STATE COURT SPLT split is 33-15. 

>> The FEDERAL COURT SCORE is 29-4 for insurers. 3 of the 4 rulings favoring policyholders are from the same judge. 

>> The STATE COURT SCORE is 9-6 in favor of policyholders. 2 of the 6 rulings favoring insurers are from the same judge. 

>> Of the 13 TOTAL DECISIONS FAVORING POLICYHOLDERS, only 4 are from federal court and 9 are from state court. 3 of the 4 federal court ruling favoring policyholders are from the same judge. 

>> 28 DIFFERENT FEDERAL JUDGES have ruled on motions -- 26 in favor of insurers and 2 in favor of policyholders. 

>> 14 DIFFERENT STATE COURT JUDGES have ruled on motions – 5 in favor of insurers and 9 in favor of policyholders. 

>> The AVERAGE LENGTH of the STATE COURT rulings FAVORING POLICYHOLDERS is 1.88 pages. 

>> The AVERAGE LENGTH of ALL FEDERAL COURT rulings is 11.37 pages.

Tuesday, October 6, 2020

This Is Your Last Tolling! -- Executive Order No. 202.67 Extends COVID-19 Tolling of Procedural Time Limits Through November 4, 2020

For the sixth time since New York's COVID-19 toll of "any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to *** the civil practice law and rules, *** or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof" went into effect, Governor Cuomo's office has further extended that toll for another 30 days. 

Executive Order 202.67, dated October 4, 2020, "do[es] hereby continue the suspensions, modifications, and directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive, made by Executive Orders 202 up to and including 202.21, and 202.27, 202.28, 202.29, 202.30, 202.38, 202.39, 202.40, 202.48, 202.49, 202.50, as extended, and Executive Order 202.55 and 202.55.1, as extended, and Executive Order 202.60 for another thirty days through November 3, 2020[.]"

"Through" means including.  

EO 202.67 does, however, signal that this may be the last extension of the COVID-19 toll, adding:
The suspension in Executive Order 202.8, as modified and extended in subsequent Executive Orders, that tolled any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to the criminal procedure law, the family court act, the civil practice law and rules, the court of claims act, the surrogate’s court procedure act, and the uniform court acts, or by any statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof, is hereby continued, as modified by prior executive orders, provided however, for any civil case, such suspension is only effective until November 3, 2020, and after such date any such time limit will no longer be tolled[.]
If Governor Cuomo means what he says and New York's COVID-19 toll is not continued past November 3, 2020, the magic number will be 229 -- 229 days added to the expiration date of the procedural time limit at issue, such as a statute of limitations or a contractual suit limitation.  I'll post more about that calculation on November 2nd.  

Those who want to know more about this toll by executive order may read my previous posts about it here and here and here.

Friday, September 4, 2020

Another (x5) 30 Days in the Toll -- Executive Order No. 202.60 Continues COVID-19 Tolling of Procedural Time Limits Through October 4, 2020

At least the Governor's office didn't wait until tomorrow morning at 6:11 AM this time.   

For the fifth time since New York's COVID-19 toll of "any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to *** the civil practice law and rules, *** or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof" went into effect, Governor Cuomo's office has further extended that toll for another 30 days. 

Executive Order 202.60, posted this afternoon, "do[es] hereby continue the suspensions, modifications, and directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive, made by Executive Orders 202 up to and including 202.21, and 202.27, 202.28, 202.29, 202.30, 202.38, 202.39, 202.40, 202.48, 202.49, 202.50, as extended, and Executive Order 202.55 and 202.55.1 for another thirty days through October 4, 2020[.]"

If New York's COVID-19 toll is not continued again past October 4, 2020, the number will be 199 -- 199 days added to the expiration date of the procedural time limit at issue, such as a statute of limitations or a contractual suit limitation. 


If you haven't been keeping track, my prior posts on this toll by executive order are here and here.

Now go enjoy your long Labor Day weekend, lawyers.

Wednesday, August 12, 2020

The Jenner Complaint

It's been dubbed "the Jenner complaint" and, last I knew, has been filed in Illinois and New York state courts. It's an evolved or mutated variant of predecessor COVID-19 BI policyholder complaints, embedding a table of contents, photos, floor plans and seating charts in its hundreds of pages in support of these policyholders' core argument that impairment or loss of function or functionality equals direct physical loss or damage.

Interested persons can follow the New York state court action's docket by clicking here.

#businessinterruptioninsurance #COVID19businessinterruptionlitigation

Thursday, August 6, 2020

DC Court Grants Summary Judgment to Commercial Property Insurer on COVID-19 Business Interruption Claim

* * * SPECIAL ALERT * * *

This afternoon the Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to Erie Insurance Exchange, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for COVID-19-related business income/ interruption losses.

The court concluded: 
With both dictionary definitions and the weight of case law supporting Defendant’s interpretation of the term "direct physical loss," Plaintiffs’ additional arguments are unconvincing. First, Plaintiffs argue that because the insurance contract has specific exclusions for "loss of use" under some coverage lines but not for Income Protection coverage, the Court should infer that the Income Protection coverage covers losses such as Plaintiffs’. Plaintiffs' Motion at 13-14. But as already discussed, even if “loss of use” was covered, Plaintiffs would still have to show that the loss of use was a "direct physical loss” similar to those in the cases discussed supra at 5-7. And for the reasons explained in this order, there was no “direct physical loss” to Plaintiffs.  Second, Plaintiffs argue that, unlike some similar insurance policies, their policies do not include a specific exclusion for pandemic-related losses. Id. at 19-20. But again, even in the absence of such an exclusion, Plaintiffs would still be required to show a 'direct physical loss.' Because they cannot do so, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendant.
The case is Rose's 1, LLC et al. v. Erie Insurance Exchange and you can read the court's decision and order by clicking here

Monday, July 6, 2020

When Did the New York Courts Reopen?

A client asked me today when the New York courts “reopened” from their COVID-19 shutdown.

After speaking with that client I determined he was really asking about when the New York state courts were again accepting filings of new, “non-essential” cases, such as personal injury or insurance coverage actions.

From a number of press releases and memoranda of the New York courts, I compiled and now share with you readers a list of the dates, by counties and regions, when the New York state courts were again "open of  business" (i.e., accepting filings of new civil lawsuits):

BY COUNTY

May 18, 2020
Broome, Chemung, Chenango, Delaware, Fulton, Genesee, Herkimer, Livingston, Monroe, Montgomery, Oneida, Ontario, Orleans, Otsego, Schoharie, Schuyler, Seneca, Steuben, Tioga, Tompkins, Wayne, Wyoming, Yates

May 20, 2020
Clinton, Essex, Franklin, Hamilton, Jefferson, Lewis, St. Lawrence

May 21, 2020
Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Niagara

May 25, 2020
Bronx, Dutchess, Kings, Nassau, New York, Orange, Putnam, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk, Sullivan, Ulster, Westchester

May 26, 2020
Albany, Columbia, Greene, Rensselaer, Saratoga, Schenectady, Warren, Washington

BY REGION
















Source:  https://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/AO-114-20.pdf

There.  All in one place.

For Whom the New York Prescribed Procedural Limitations Period Tolls -- New York Executive Order 202.48


Just shy of 9:00 PM tonight (July 6, 2020), someone using a Ricoh IM C6000 (show Document Properties) scanned  Governor Andrew Cuomo's Executive Order 202.48, "continuing" for another 30 days through August 5, 2020, the tolling of "any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to *** the civil practice law and rules,  *** or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof[.]"

Those who have been keeping track will recall that it was Executive Order 202.8, issued on March 20, 2020, when New York was shutting down to prevent the spread of COVID-19, that first
temporarily suspend[ed] or modif[ied], for the period from the date of this Executive Order through April 19, 2020 the following: 
• In accordance with the directive of the Chief Judge of the State to limit court operations to essential matters during the pendency of the COVID-19 health crisis, any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to the criminal procedure law, the family court act, the civil practice law and rules, the court of claims act, the surrogate's court procedure act, and the uniform court acts, or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof, is hereby tolled from the date of this executive order until April 19, 2020[.]
What followed through 9:00 PM tonight has been a series of executive orders "continuing" the tolling provision of Executive Order 202.8:
  • on April 7, 2020, Executive Order 202.14 "continue[d] the suspensions and modifications of law, and any directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive, made by Executive Order 202 and each successor Executive Order to 202, for thirty days until May 7, 2020"; 

  • on May 7, 2020, Executive Order 202.28 "continue[d] the suspensions and modifications of law, and any directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive, made by Executive Order 202 and each successor Executive Order up to and including to Executive Order 202.14, for thirty days until June 6, 2020"; and 

  • on June 6, 2020, Executive Order 202.38 "continue[d] the suspensions and modifications of law, and any directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive, made by Executive Order 202 and each successor Executive Order up to and including to Executive Order 202.14, as continued as contained in Executive Order 202.27 and 202.28 until July 6, 2020[.]"
The tolling provision of Executive Order 202.8. as continued by 202.14, 202.28, 202.38 and 202.48, now runs "though August 5, 2020".

What this means, in effect, is that "any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to *** the civil practice law and rules,  *** or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof" is tolled through at least August 5, 2020.

In essence, any time limitation falling within the scope of EO 202.8, as continued, froze on March 20, 2020.  How much additional time the party will have to commence, file or serve will depend on whether the otherwise applicable procedural limitations period expired during or after the tolling period.

Procedural limitation period expiring DURING the tolling period:

>>  Count the number of days from and including March 20, 2020 to and including the original limitations period's expiration date and add that number of days to the date on which the tolling expires.

For example, if a plaintiff's applicable statute of limitations period to commence a personal injury action based on negligence was set to expire on March 31, 2020, that plaintiff will have 12 days (include March 20th as one tolled day) after the expiration of the current tolling period to commence that action.  If the August 5, 2020 expiration date is not again "continued", that plaintiff will have until August 17, 2020 (12 days after August 5th) to commence her personal injury action.

Procedural limitation period expiring AFTER the tolling period:

>>  Count the number of days from and including March 20, 2020 to the end date of the COVID-19 tolling period and add that number of days to the prescribed limitations period after the tolling expires.

For example, if the current August 5, 2020 tolling end date is not again continued,  a plaintiff whose limitations period is set to expire after August 5, 2020 will have 139 days after August 5, 2020 or by December 14, 2020 (December 13 is a Sunday) to commence her action.

Question:  Does this tolling apply to the two-year contractual suit limitations period of a property insurance policy?

Answer:  Unclear, but probably.  EO 202.8 refers only to time limits "as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to *** the civil practice law and rules,  *** or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation[.]"  Technically speaking, a contractual suit limitations period is not one "prescribed by the procedural laws of the state".  New York Insurance Law § 3404(e) does not "prescribe" a two-year suit limitations period, and Insurance Law § 3404(f)(1)(A) mandates that a New York policy that insures against fire contain, "with respect to the peril of fire, terms and provisions no less favorable to the insured than those contained in the standard fire policy [§ 3404(e)].

Before testing this question in litigation,  however, consider giving me or your favorite New York first-party property coverage counsel a call to discuss the arguments that can be made for and against tolling of a property insurance policy's suit limitations period.  And/or read the Appellate Division, Fourth Department's 2010 decision in Dail v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. (74 AD 3d 28 [4th Dept. 2010])("the 'death toll' in CPLR 210(a) is applicable to an action against an insurer where the policy at issue contains the two-year limitations period contained in Insurance Law § 3404 (e)").  If statutory tolls apply to a contractual limitations period, a strong argument can be made that the administrative COVID-19 toll will apply, as well.