SOCIAL MEDIA DISCOVERY – DEFENSE OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM – FACEBOOK CONTENT
Forman v. Henkin(Ct. Apps., 2/13/2018)
Since 2011, I have included in my social media research presentations a slide setting forth the two-prong showing that most state courts require for a party to obtain another party's protected, "friends-only", or non-public social media content. Up until last Tuesday, the New York trial and appellate courts followed that two-pronged rule, requiring on a motion to compel or for a protective order that the party seeking disclosure demonstrate to the court's satisfaction:
- that the sought social media content is relevant to the plaintiff's injury claims (the "relevance" prong); and
- that the protected social media content being sought actually exists (the "factual predicate" prong).
The challenge, of course, of the second prong was showing that relevant content was within someone's Facebook account when that person's account was restricted to friends only. How does one convince the court what furnishings are within a room that has no windows and a solid, locked door?
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Judge Janet DiFiore, the New York Court of Appeals has now rejected the "factual predicate" requirement for obtaining non-public Facebook content of a personal injury plaintiff, returning New York courts to New York's traditional CPLR 3101-based rule of discovery in social media content discovery disputes:
A party seeking discovery must satisfy the threshold requirement that the request is reasonably calculated to yield information that is "material and necessary" — i.e., relevant — regardless of whether discovery is sought from another party.The former two-pronged test for obtaining non-public Facebook content in New York state court civil actions is now a single prong test:
Is the discovery demand appropriately limited and reasonably calculated
to yield relevant information?
The plaintiff in this action alleged that she was injured when she fell from a horse owned by defendant, suffering spinal and traumatic brain injuries resulting in cognitive deficits, memory loss, difficulties with written and oral communication, and social isolation. At her deposition, plaintiff stated that she previously had a Facebook account on which she posted "a lot" of photographs showing her pre-accident active lifestyle but that she deactivated the account about six months after the accident and could not recall whether any post-accident photographs were posted. She maintained that she had become reclusive as a result of her injuries and also had difficulty using a computer and composing coherent messages.
Defendant sought an unlimited authorization to obtain plaintiff's entire "private" Facebook account, contending the photographs and written postings would be material and necessary to his defense of the action under CPLR 3101(a). When plaintiff did not produce the demanded authorization, defendant moved to compel, asserting that the Facebook material sought was relevant to the scope of plaintiff's injuries and her credibility, contending that photographs and messages plaintiff posted on Facebook after the accident would likely be material to plaintiff's injury allegations and her claim that the accident negatively impacted her ability to read, write, word-find, reason and use a computer.
Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that defendant failed to establish a basis for access to the "private" portion of her Facebook account because, among other things, the "public" portion contained only a single photograph that did not contradict plaintiff's claims or deposition testimony.
Supreme Court GRANTED the motion to compel to the limited extent of directing plaintiff to produce:
- all photographs of herself privately posted on Facebook prior to the accident that she intended to introduce at trial;
- all photographs of herself privately posted on Facebook after the accident that do not depict nudity or romantic encounters; and
- an authorization for Facebook records showing each time plaintiff posted a private message after the accident and the number of characters or words in the messages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the Appellate Division's order and reinstated Supreme Court's ruling, holding:
Disclosure in civil actions is generally governed by CPLR 3101(a), which directs: "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof." We have emphasized that "[t]he words material and necessary,' . . . are to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening [*3]the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]; see also Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 746 [2000]). A party seeking discovery must satisfy the threshold requirement that the request is reasonably calculated to yield information that is "material and necessary" — i.e., relevant — regardless of whether discovery is sought from another party (see CPLR 3101[a][1]) or a nonparty (CPLR 3101[a][4]; see e.g. Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32 [2014]). The "statute embodies the policy determination that liberal discovery encourages fair and effective resolution of disputes on the merits, minimizing the possibility for ambush and unfair surprise" (Spectrum Systems Intern. Corp. v Chemical Bank, 78 NY2d 371, 376 [1991]).
* * * * *
In addition to these restrictions, this Court has recognized that "litigants are not without protection against unnecessarily onerous application of the disclosure statutes. Under our discovery statutes and case law competing interests must always be balanced; the need for discovery must be weighed against any special burden to be borne by the opposing party" (Kavanaugh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., 92 NY2d 952, 954 [1998] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3103[a]). Thus, when courts are called upon to resolve a dispute,[FN2] discovery requests "must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with due regard for the strong policy supporting open disclosure . . . Absent an [error of law or an] abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb such a determination (Andon, supra, 94 NY2d at 747; see Kavanaugh, supra, 92 NY2d at 954).[FN3]
Here, we apply these general principles in the context of a dispute over disclosure of social media materials. Facebook is a social networking website "where people can share information about their personal lives, including posting photographs and sharing information about what they are doing or thinking" (Romano v Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc 3d 426 [Sup Ct Suffolk County 2010]). Users create unique personal profiles, make connections with new and old "friends" and may "set privacy levels to control with whom they share their information" (id.). Portions of an account that are "public" can be accessed by anyone, regardless of whether the viewer has been accepted as a "friend" by the account holder — in fact, the viewer need not even be a fellow Facebook account holder (see Facebook Help: What audiences can I choose from when I share? https://www.facebook. com/help/211513702214269?helpref=faq_content [last accessed January 15, 2018]). However, if portions of an account are "private," this typically means that items are shared only with "friends" or a subset of "friends" identified by the account holder (id.). While Facebook — and sites like it — offer relatively new means of sharing information with others, there is nothing so novel about Facebook materials that precludes application of New York's long-standing disclosure rules to resolve this dispute.
On appeal in this Court, invoking New York's history of liberal discovery, defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in employing a heightened threshold for production of social media records that depends on what the account holder has chosen to share on the public portion of the account. We agree. Although it is unclear precisely what standard the Appellate Division applied, it cited its prior decision in Tapp v New York State Urban Dev. Corp. (102 AD3d 620 [1st Dept 2013]), which stated: "To warrant discovery, defendants must establish a factual predicate for their request by identifying relevant information in plaintiff's Facebook account — that is, information that contradicts or conflicts with plaintiff's alleged restrictions, disabilities, and losses, and other claims'" (id. at 620 [emphasis added]). Several courts applying this rule appear to have conditioned discovery of material on the "private" portion of a Facebook account on whether the party seeking disclosure demonstrated there was material in the "public" portion that tended to contradict the injured party's allegations in some respect (see e.g. Spearin v Linmar, 129 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2015]; Nieves v 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, 39 Misc 3d 63 [App Term 2013]; Pereira v City of New York, 40 Misc 3d 1210[A] [Sup Ct Queens County 2013]; Romano, supra, 30 Misc 3d 426). Plaintiff invoked this precedent when arguing, in opposition to the motion to compel, that defendant failed to meet the minimum threshold permitting discovery of any Facebook materials.
Before discovery has occurred — and unless the parties are already Facebook "friends" — the party seeking disclosure may view only the materials the account holder happens to have posted on the public portion of the account. Thus, a threshold rule requiring that party to "identify relevant information in [the] Facebook account" effectively permits disclosure only in limited circumstances, allowing the account holder to unilaterally obstruct disclosure merely by manipulating "privacy" settings or curating the materials on the public portion of the account [FN4]. [*4]Under such an approach, disclosure turns on the extent to which some of the information sought is already accessible — and not, as it should, on whether it is "material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action" (see CPLR 3101[a]).
New York discovery rules do not condition a party's receipt of disclosure on a showing that the items the party seeks actually exist; rather, the request need only be appropriately tailored and reasonably calculated to yield relevant information. Indeed, as the name suggests, the purpose of discovery is to determine if material relevant to a claim or defense exists. In many if not most instances, a party seeking disclosure will not be able to demonstrate that items it has not yet obtained contain material evidence. Thus, we reject the notion that the account holder's so-called "privacy" settings govern the scope of disclosure of social media materials.
That being said, we agree with other courts that have rejected the notion that commencement of a personal injury action renders a party's entire Facebook account automatically discoverable (see e.g. Kregg v Maldonado, 98 AD3d 1289, 1290 [4th Dept 2012] [rejecting motion to compel disclosure of all social media accounts involving injured party without prejudice to narrowly-tailored request seeking only relevant information]; Giacchetto, supra, 293 FRD 112, 115; Kennedy v Contract Pharmacal Corp., 2013 WL 1966219, *2 [ED NY 2013]). Directing disclosure of a party's entire Facebook account is comparable to ordering discovery of every photograph or communication that party shared with any person on any topic prior to or since the incident giving rise to litigation — such an order would be likely to yield far more nonrelevant than relevant information. Even under our broad disclosure paradigm, litigants are protected from "unnecessarily onerous application of the discovery statutes" (Kavanaugh, supra, 92 NY2d at 954).
Rather than applying a one-size-fits-all rule at either of these extremes, courts addressing disputes over the scope of social media discovery should employ our well-established rules — there is no need for a specialized or heightened factual predicate to avoid improper "fishing expeditions." In the event that judicial intervention becomes necessary, courts should first consider the nature of the event giving rise to the litigation and the injuries claimed, as well as any other information specific to the case, to assess whether relevant material is likely to be found on the Facebook account. Second, balancing the potential utility of the information sought against any specific "privacy" or other concerns raised by the account holder, the court should issue an order tailored to the particular controversy that identifies the types of materials that must be disclosed while avoiding disclosure of nonrelevant materials. In a personal injury case such as this it is appropriate to consider the nature of the underlying incident and the injuries claimed and to craft a rule for discovering information specific to each. Temporal limitations may also be appropriate — for example, the court should consider whether photographs or messages posted years before an accident are likely to be germane to the litigation. Moreover, to the extent the account may contain sensitive or embarrassing materials of marginal relevance, the account holder can seek protection from the court (see CPLR 3103[a]). Here, for example, Supreme Court exempted from disclosure any photographs of plaintiff depicting nudity or romantic encounters.
Plaintiff suggests that disclosure of social media materials necessarily constitutes an unjustified invasion of privacy. We assume for purposes of resolving the narrow issue before us that some materials on a Facebook account may fairly be characterized as private [FN5]. But even private materials may be subject to discovery if they are [*5]relevant. For example, medical records enjoy protection in many contexts under the physician-patient privilege (see CPLR 4504). But when a party commences an action, affirmatively placing a mental or physical condition in issue, certain privacy interests relating to relevant medical records — including the physician-patient privilege — are waived (see Arons v Jutkowitz, 9 NY3d 393, 409 [2007]; Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278, 287 [1989]). For purposes of disclosure, the threshold inquiry is not whether the materials sought are private but whether they are reasonably calculated to contain relevant information.
Applying these principles here, the Appellate Division erred in modifying Supreme Court's order to further restrict disclosure of plaintiff's Facebook account, limiting discovery to only those photographs plaintiff intended to introduce at trial [FN6]. With respect to the items Supreme Court ordered to be disclosed (the only portion of the discovery request we may consider), defendant more than met his threshold burden of showing that plaintiff's Facebook account was reasonably likely to yield relevant evidence. At her deposition, plaintiff indicated that, during the period prior to the accident, she posted "a lot" of photographs showing her active lifestyle. Likewise, given plaintiff's acknowledged tendency to post photographs representative of her activities on Facebook, there was a basis to infer that photographs she posted after the accident might be reflective of her post-accident activities and/or limitations. The request for these photographs was reasonably calculated to yield evidence relevant to plaintiff's assertion that she could no longer engage in the activities she enjoyed before the accident and that she had become reclusive. It happens in this case that the order was naturally limited in temporal scope because plaintiff deactivated her Facebook account six months after the accident and Supreme Court further exercised its discretion to exclude photographs showing nudity or romantic encounters, if any, presumably to avoid undue embarrassment or invasion of privacy.
In addition, it was reasonably likely that the data revealing the timing and number of characters in posted messages would be relevant to plaintiffs' claim that she suffered cognitive injuries that caused her to have difficulty writing and using the computer, particularly her claim that she is painstakingly slow in crafting messages. Because Supreme Court provided defendant no access to the content of any messages on the Facebook account (an aspect of the order we cannot review given defendant's failure to appeal to the Appellate Division), we have no occasion to further address whether defendant made a showing sufficient to obtain disclosure of such content and, if so, how the order could have been tailored, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, to avoid discovery of nonrelevant materials.[FN7]
In sum, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that defendant had not met his threshold burden of showing that the materials from plaintiff's Facebook account that were ordered to be disclosed pursuant to Supreme Court's order were reasonably calculated to contain evidence "material and necessary" to the litigation. A remittal is not necessary here because, in opposition to the motion, plaintiff neither made a claim of statutory privilege, nor offered any other specific reason — beyond the general assertion that defendant did not meet his threshold burden — why any of those materials should be shielded from disclosure.Under the Court of Appeals' ruling in this case, discovery demands for non-public Facebook content that are appropriately tailored and reasonably calculated to yield relevant information should pass judicial muster and be enforceable. Although this decision does not represent a one-size-fits-all rule for discovery of non-public social media content, it does give guidance to civil litigants and New York state courts on the scope of permissible social medial content discovery. The factual predicate (existence) prong is out; limited fishing is in.
