Insured's 6-Month Delay in Notifying His Insurer of Dog-Bite Incident Found Unreasonable as a Matter of Law

HOMEOWNERS – LATE NOTICE – DOG-BITE INCIDENT – NO-PREJUDICE RULE – GOOD-FAITH BELIEF IN NONLIABILITY
Zimmerman v Peerless Ins. Co.
(2nd Dept., decided 6/21/2011) 

I knew that into an 8-month hole in blogging there would be some back filling.   Here's some late notice fill. 

On October 31, 2006, while jogging in Eaton's Neck, New York, Arthur Angst allegedly was bitten by Erwin Zimmerman's unleashed dog.  Angst and Zimmerman had a brief verbal confrontation, during which Zimmerman saw blood on Angst's hand.  Zimmerman offered to pay Angst's medical expenses, but Angst declined, and the two men did not exchange contact information.  Zimmerman was aware of an incident several years before, in which his dog had "nipped" a neighbor. Within 48 hours of the incident involving Zimmerman's dog and Angst, the Suffolk County Department of Health requested the dog's vaccination records and informed Zimmerman that the dog would be restricted to Zimmerman's property.

Just over six months later, on May 8, 2008, Zimmerman was served with the summons and complaint in the underlying personal injury action. The next day, for the first time, he notified his insurer, Peerless Insurance Company, of the incident.  Zimmerman's insurance policy required that 

in case of an ... "occurrence," the "insured" will perform the following duties that apply:

Give written notice to us or our agent as soon as is practical, which sets forth: 

(1) The identity of the policy and "insured"; 

(2) Reasonably available information on the time, place and circumstances of the ... "occurrence"; and 

(3) Names and addresses of any claimants or witnesses.  

The policy defined an "occurrence" as "an accident ... which results, during the policy period, in: ... 'Bodily injury'" and "bodily injury" was defined, in relevant part, as "bodily harm."

By letter dated May 11, 2008, Peerless disclaimed coverage on the ground that Zimmerman had not complied with the notice provisions of the policy.  Zimmerman commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring that Peerless was required to defend and indemnify him in the underlying action. Following discovery, Peerless moved, and Zimmerman cross-moved, for summary judgment. Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), denied the motion and cross motion, and both parties appealed.

In REVERSING the order appealed from insofar as Peerless' motion was concerned, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that while Peerless had established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of the insured's late notice, the insured had not carried his opposing burden of raising a triable issue of fact as to whether there existed a reasonable excuse for his delay in notifying Peerless of the dog-bite incident:

Here, Peerless established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that Zimmerman's failure to notify Peerless for six months was not based on a reasonable or good faith belief in nonliability by demonstrating that Zimmerman knew immediately that his dog allegedly bit Angst and that Angst may have been injured by the bite. Indeed, Zimmerman knew within 48 hours that a complaint had been made about the incident, even if he did not know Angst's identity. In addition, Zimmerman knew of at least one substantiated incident involving his dog prior to the incident with Angst (see Steinberg v Hermitage Ins. Co., 26 AD3d 426, 427 [2006]; C.C.R. Realty of Dutchess v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 304, 305 [2003]; 120 Whitehall Realty Assoc., LLC v Hermitage Ins. Corp., 40 AD3d at 721; cf. Courduff's Oakwood Rd. Gardens & Landscaping Co., Inc. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 717 [2011]; Ponok Realty Corp. v United Natl. Specialty Ins. Co., 69 AD3d at 597; Sputnik Rest. Corp. v United Natl. Ins. Co., 62 AD3d at 689). Consequently, the burden shifted to Zimmerman to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there existed a reasonable excuse for his delay in notifying Peerless (see Ponok Realty Corp. v United Natl. Specialty Ins. Co., 69 AD3d at 597; Sputnik Rest. Corp. v United Natl. Ins. Co., 62 AD3d at 689). Even construing all inferences in favor of Zimmerman, he failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Hanson v Turner Constr. Co., 70 AD3d 641, 643 [2010]; 120 Whitehall Realty Assoc., LLC v Hermitage Ins. Corp., 40 AD3d at 721; Steinberg v Hermitage Ins. Inc., 26 AD3d at 427; C.C.R. Realty of Dutchess v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1 AD3d at 305). We reject Zimmerman's argument that the policy was ambiguous as to whether he was obligated to give notice of the occurrence before learning of the possible claimant's identity (see Magistro v Buttered Bagel, Inc., 79 AD3d 822 [2010]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying Peerless' motion for summary judgment declaring that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Zimmerman in the underlying action. In light of this determination, the Supreme Court properly denied Zimmerman's cross motion for summary judgment.  

Because Zimmerman's policy was issued before January 17, 2009 (see Insurance Law § 3420 [c] [2] [A]), Peerless was not required to demonstrate prejudice from Zimmerman's six-month delay in notification.